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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1968 Dillon v. Legg' established a new limit on liability for the emo-
tional distress2 suffered by a bystander as a result of witnessing the negli-
gently caused injury of a family member. This decision was both heralded and
criticized by the legal community.3 Since its inception Dillon has been rein-
terpreted nearly every year by California lower courts.4 As a result, the Dillon
rule has taken on a different character Originally seen as a broad-reaching
abrogation of the zone of danger rule, 6 Dillon now can be viewed as simply
another halting step in the long search for a better rule to govern bystander
liability.7 The decision espoused an essentially mechanical rule that has failed
because it retains traditional negligence elements arguably ill-suited for by-
stander liability. This Comment will explore the transformation of what was
1. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
2. The term "emotional distress" is employed by most U.S. jurisdictions. The Restatement (Second) of
Torts notes, however, that the terms "mental suffering, mental anguish, [and] mental or nervous shock" also
may be utilized. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment j (1965). This Comment will use the term
"emotional distress" because the California courts have adopted that phrase. This Comment focuses only on
California's treatment of "bystander" claims-claims that arise after the plaintiff witnesses the harm caused to a
third person by the defendant. Situations falling under §§ 46, 312, or 313 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
are beyond the scope of this Comment.
3. See, e.g., Note, Recovery for Emotional Trauma and Consequent Physical Harm by Witnesses Not
Within the Zone of Danger, 18 AM. U.L. REV. 577 (1969); Recent Case, Negligence-Physical Injury Caused by
Emotional Trauma-Recovery Possible When Plaintiff Witnesses Accident in Which Her Infant Daughter Was
Killed by Defendant's Negligent Act, 73 DICK. L. REV. 350 (1969); Comment, Bystander Recovery for Mental
Distress, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 429 (1969); Comment, A New Boundaryfor Zone of Peril, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 125
(1969); Comment, Dillon v. Legg: Extension of Tort Liability in the Field of Mental Distress, 4 U.S.F.L. REV.
116 (1969); Note, Torts-Liability to Witnesses of Accidents, 1969 WIS. L. REV. 661 (1969).
4. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d. 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980); Hoyem v.
Manhattan Beach City School Dist., 22 Cal. 3d 508, 585 P.2d 851, 150 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1978); Justus v. Atchison, 19
Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 112, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977); Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal.
Rptr. 863 (1977); Hathaway v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. App. 3d 728, 169 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1980); Drew v. Drake,
110 Cal. App. 3d 555, 168 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1980); Austin v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 89 Cal. App. 3d 354, 152 Cal.
Rptr. 420 (1979); Parsons v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 3d 506, 146 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1978); Nazaroff v. Superior
Court, 80 Cal. App. 3d 553, 145 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1978); Arauz v. Gerhardt, 68 Cal. App. 3d 937, 137 Cal. Rptr. 619
(1977); Mobaldi v. Board of Regents, 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1976); Hair v. County of
Monterey, 45 Cal. App. 3d 538, 119 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1975); Powers v. Sissoev, 39 Cal. App. 3d 865, 114 Cal. Rptr.
868 (1974); Jansen v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 106 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1973); Deboe v.
Horn, 16 Cal. App. 3d 221, 94 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1971); Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr.
723 (1969).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 68-136.
6. See, e.g., Comment, A New Boundary for Zone of Peril, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 125, 131 (1969).
7. "In short, the history of the cases does not show the development of a logical rule but rather a series of
changes and abandonments." Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728,746,441 P.2d 912,924,69 Cal. Rptr. 72,84 (1968).
Dillon remains, nevertheless, the seminal case cited in most jurisdictions that have expanded the scope of
bystander recovery. See, e.g., Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 106 (Iowa 1981).
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intended to be an expansive rule into a rule belabored by restrictive require-
ments.8 This Comment also will examine the policies adopted by cases ap-
plying the latter interpretation9 and will propose an alternate procedure for
adjudicating bystander claims."0
II. HISTORY OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IN BYSTANDER SITUATIONS
The issues confronted in Dillon are not novel. Courts and commentators
frequently recognized the probable merit of claims for emotional distress
resulting from the plaintiff's observation of tortious injury suffered by
another," but courts permitted recovery only in the narrowest circum-
stances. 2 Dillon purported to eliminate the begrudging attitude that the ju-
diciary traditionally demonstrated toward bystander cases. 3 Certain ob-
stacles to greater liability not overcome by previous courts, however, did not
vanish with the Dillon court's desire to overcome them.
Initially, judicial fear of the courts' inability to evaluate evidence of
causation and harm and to award a proper quantum of compensatory damages
produced an absolute bar to bystander claims. 14 Courts also were concerned
with discouraging fraudulent or frivolous actions. 15 These fears either dimin-
ished through advances in behavioral and physical science 6 or were tolerated
as inherent in the judicial process. 7 The resolution of these problems pre-
sented little difficulty to those courts seeking to establish wider liability.' 8
Bystander liability, however, presents other difficulties that cannot be
overcome so easily. If liability is to expand, a rational rule to determine a new
limit on liability must first exist. Many courts are wary of ever broadening
liability and object to what they perceive as the inherent inequity of burdening
the defendant with damages for the emotional distress suffered by bystanders
8. See infra text accompanying notes 68-136.
9. Id.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 137-41.
11. See, e.g., Spade v. Lynn & B.R., 168 Mass. 285,47 N.E. 88 (1897); F. BOHLEN, STUDIES INTHE LAW
OF TORTS 287-90 (1926); T. COOLEY, THE LAW OF TORTS 26-29 (1907).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 20-35.
13. We see no good reason why the general rules of tort law... long applied to all other types of
injury, should not govern the case now before us .... The refusal to apply these general rules to
actions of this particular kind of physical injury is nothing short of a denial of justice."
Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 746,441 P.2d 912, 924, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 84 (1968) (quoting from Throckmorton,
Damages for Fright, 34 HARV. L. REV. 260, 277 (1921)).
14. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 107,45 N.E. 354 (1896). "If the right of recovery in
this class of cases should be once established, it would naturally result in a flood of litigation in cases where the
injury complained of may be easily feigned without detection, and where damages must rest upon conjecture or
speculation." Id. at 110, 45 N.E. at 354-55.
15. Id.
16. See Harvard, Reasonable Foresight of Nervous Shock, 19 MOD. L. REV. 478,478-82 (1956); Comment,
Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an Independent Tort, 59 GEO. L.J. 1237, 1258-62 (1971).
17. See Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231,239, 21 A.2d 402, 405 (1941); Owens v. Liverpool Corp.,
[1939] 1 K.B. 394, 400.
18. For example, Prosser noted that "[a]ll these objections have been demolished many times, and it is
threshing old straw to deal with them." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 327 (4th ed. 1971)
(footnote omitted).
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when he or she merely acts negligently.' 9 Defining the limits of liability con-
tinues to present the most significant obstacle to reaching a rational rule.
A. The Impact Rule
The impact rule was the first standard adopted that recognized the merit
of emotional distress and avoided unlimited liability. Recovery for emotional
distress characterized as "pain and suffering" traditionally had been per-
mitted as an element of damages in personal injury actions.2 Recovery for
emotional distress was dependent on the existence of physical injury, because
absent physical injury that produced the emotional distress no action in
negligence was possible.2! ' Under the impact rule the plaintiff could maintain a
cause of action if he could allege that the defendant's act produced some
physical contact.22 Even though the physical impact may have played no role
in causing the emotional harm suffered, recovery nevertheless was per-
mitted.23 The sole purpose of requiring physical contact and requiring tangible
evidence to substantiate the plaintiff's claim, although unrelated to the emo-
tional distress, was to make feigning emotional distress more difficult.24
Additionally, because the defendant was liable only if physical contact oc-
curred, the circumstances required for emotional distress liability under the
impact rule were nearly identical to the more conventional personal injury
claim.25 The foes of emotional distress liability could accept that compromise.
The impact rule represented the accepted standard in all leading indus-
trial states in the early twentieth century.26 The patent artificiality of an im-
pact requirment even if that impact was unrelated to the emotional harm,
however, led to the abandonment of the impact rule in England where it had
originated.27 Similarly, the American jurisdictions that had followed the
British lead in establishing the impact rule gradually moved toward a more
reasonable basis of liability. 28 Today the impact rule is followed in a dwindling
minority of jurisdictions.29
19. See, e.g., Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935). Liability to bystanders "would put
an unreasonable burden upon users of the highway... and enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping
point." Id. at 613, 258 N.W. at 501.
20. See W. PROSSER, supra note 18, at 330.
21. See, e.g., Keyes v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co., 36 Minn. 290, 293, 30 N.W. 888, 889 (1886).
22. See, e.g., Beaty v. Buckeye Fabric Finishing Co., 179 F. Supp. 688, 697 (E.D. Ark. 1959); Morse v.
Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 117 Ky. 11, 77 S.W. 361, 362 (1903).
23. The impact required has been reduced to an insignificant level in a number ofcases. See, e.g., Porter v.
Delaware, L. & R. Co., 73 N.J.L. 405, 63 A. 860 (1906) (dust in eyes); Morton v. Stack, 122 Ohio St. 115, 170
N.E. 869 (1930) (smoke inhalation); Zelinski v. Chimics, 196 Pa. Super. 312, 175 A.2d 351 (1961) (jostling of
occupants in automobile).
24. W. PROSSER, supra note 18, at 330.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 331.
27. Dulieu v. White, [1901] 2 K.B. 669, overruling Victorian Rys. Comm'rs v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222
(P.C. 1888).
28. See infra text accompanying notes 30-35.
29. Florida (Butchikas v. Travelers' Indem. Co., 343 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 1977)); Georgia (Howard v. Blood-
worth, 137 Ga. App. 478, 224 S.E.2d 122 (1976)); Illinois (Cutright v. City Nat'l Bank of Kankakee, 88 I11. App.
3d 742, 410 N.E.2d 1142 (1980). But see Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 101111. App. 3d 439, 428 N.E.2d 596
1982]
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B. The Zone of Danger Rule
The zone of danger rule eventually replaced the impact rule as the stan-
dard rule of liability30 This rule retained the logic of the impact rule and yet
expanded liability. Thus, a bystander could recover for emotional distress if at
the time of the injury to the third person he was within the area of physical
risk engendered by the defendant. 3' The underlying assumption of this rule is
that any emotional distress suffered can be attributed to fear for one's own
safety, rather than a reaction to another's injury.32
Under this rule the defendant had no duty beyond avoidance of physical
injury. Any greater liability was considered too extravagant in a world where
unpleasant and potentially disturbing events occur with distressing regularity.
Waube v. Warrington33 represented the view of most jurisdictions when it
addressed the issue of an independent duty to avoid emotional distress:
The answer to this question cannot be reached solely by logic, nor is it clear that it
can be entirely disposed of by a consideration of what the defendant ought rea-
sonably to have anticipated as a consequence of his wrong. The answer must be
reached by balancing the social interests involved in order to ascertain how far
defendant's duty and plaintiff's right may justly and expediently be extended. 34
Thus, an expansion beyond the zone of danger rule was unlikely absent a
realignment in judicial and societal attitudes. Such a change eventually cre-
ated a potentially broader scope of liability in Dillon.35
C. Pre-Dillon Approach to Emotional Distress-Amaya
Before Dillon California courts specifically rejected the impact rule in
Cook v. Maier56 and, instead, applied the zone of danger rule to bystander
claims.37 A critique of Dillon must begin with a discussion of the case it
overruled, Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co.35 In Amaya the plaintiff
mother observed the defendant's truck strike and kill her infant son. She
alleged that she suffered shock attributable entirely to witnessing the death of
her son, rather than fearing for her own safety. The plaintiff was given the
opportunity to amend her complaint to allege the requisite fear for her own
(1981) (rejecting impact rule in favor ofDillon rule)); Indiana (Elzav. Liberty Loan Corp., 426 N.E.2d 1302 (Ind.
1981) (dissenting to denial of transfer)); Kentucky (Louisville & N. R.R. v. Roberts, 207 Ky. 310, 269 S.W. 333
(1925)); and Missouri (McCardle v. George B. Peck Dry Goods Co., 191 Mo. App. 263, 177 S.W. 1095 (1915)).
30. See Comment, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Keeping Dillon in Bounds, 37 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1235, 1237 (1980).
31. See, e.g., Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969).
32. Several states, including California, denied recovery if the plaintiff's emotional distress was due solely
to fear for another's well-being. See Simons, Psychic Injury and the Bystander: The Transcontinental Dispute
Between California and New York, 51 Sr. JOHN's L. REV. 1, 11 (1976).
33. 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
34. Id. at 613, 258 N.W. at 501.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 49-65.
36. 33 Cal. App. 2d 581, 92 P.2d 434 (1939).
37. See Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
38. Id.
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safety to conform with the zone of danger rule, but she declined.3 9 As a
result, the California Supreme Court was obliged to consider whether an
independent duty to avoid infliction of emotional distress could be estab-
lished. The majority, over a strong dissent, declined to recognize that duty,4
basing its decision on "administrative and socioeconomic factors.,
4 1
Looking first at administrative concerns, the court confronted the prob-
lem of limiting liability by examining Dean Prosser's proposed guidelines:
It is clear that the injury threatened or inflicted upon the third person must be a
serious one, of a nature to cause severe shock to the plaintiff, and that the shock
must result in physical harm. The action might well be confined to members of the
immediate family, or perhaps to husband, wife, parent or child, to the exclusion of
bystanders and remote relatives. As an additional safeguard, it has been said that
the plaintiff must be present at the time of the accident, or at least that the shock
be fairly contemporaneous with it.
42
The majority challenged the potential results of the application of the Prosser
guidelines:
[W]hat if the plaintiff was honestly mistaken in believing the third person to be in
danger or to be seriously injured? ... [W]hat if the third person was the plaintiff's
beloved niece or nephew, grandparent, fiance or lifelong friend, as dear to the
plaintiff as her more immediate family? ... [H]ow soon is "fairly contempo-
raneous"? What is the magic in the plantiff being "present"? Is the shock any less
immediate if the mother does not know of the accident until the injured child is
brought home? And what if the plaintiff is present at the scene but is nevertheless
unaware of the danger of injury.., until shortly after the accident has oc-
curred?
43
The court doubted that any limitation could be formulated that would apply
fairly to future litigants and avoid the problems discussed above. 44 The court
also expressed concern over the potential absence of probative evidence re-
garding the plaintiff's emotional condition.45
In considering the socioeconomic circumstances that supported its de-
cision, the court balanced the utility of activities likely to produce emotional
distress in bystanders against the interests of emotional tranquility.46 It pre-
dicted that significant detrimental effects upon economic growth and the in-
surance system would result if liability were expanded to include persons not
placed in physical danger:
As the industrial society in which we live becomes still more complex and the use
of the streets and highways and airways increases, a certain percentage of acci-
39. Id. at 298, 379 P.2d at 514, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 34. See supra note 32.
40. Id. at 309, 379 P.2d at 522, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 42.
41. Id. at 309-15, 379 P.2d at 522-25, Cal. Rptr. at 42-45.
42. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 182 (2d ed. 1955).
43. 59 Cal. 2d 295, 313, 379 P.2d 513, 523-24, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 43-44 (1963).
44. Id. at 313, 379 P.2d at 524, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
45. Id. at 311-12, 379 P.2d at 523, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 43.
46. Id. at 314, 379 P.2d at 525, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
1982]
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dents therefrom appears to become statistically inevitable. There will be losses,
and our present system of insurance attempts to compensate for them .... But
could that system-imperfect at best-adequately and fairly absorb the far-
reaching extension of liability that would follow from judicial abrogation of the
[zone of danger rule] ... ?4
Although the court's criticisms of Prosser's guidelines were valid, and the
fears expressed were significant, no justification existed for total denial of
responsibility on the part of the defendant. The court inequitably allocated the
costs of the defendant's activities to the plaintiff.4 A better solution would
have been a limitation on the predicted "far-reaching extension"; however,
the court rejected the feasibility of any such limitation. Until a reasonable
means of defining the scope of liability for bystander harm could be devel-
oped, the zone of danger rule appeared irreplaceable.
III. DILLON-A CHANGE IN THE LAW
The California Supreme Court had an opportunity to reexamine the by-
stander rule five years after Amaya. In Dillon v. Legg49 a mother and daughter
witnessed the death of another daughter who was struck by the defendant's
automobile." The facts illustrate the harshness resulting from the artificiality
of the zone of danger rule. If the rule had been applied, recovery to the mother
would have been denied. The evidence showed that the mother was posi-
tioned farther from the deceased than was her other daughter. Under the
Amaya rule the daughter was within the zone of danger and so could maintain
a cause of action. Since the mother was near but not within the area of
physical risk,5 however, she could not claim a cause of action. The Dillon
majority rejected this result and declared that the facts demonstrated "the
hopeless artificiality of the zone-of-danger rule.",5
2
The Dillon majority perceived the fear of fraudulent claims as the primary
obstacle to establishing an independent duty to bystanders.53 The court
cleared this hurdle by noting that emotional distress was a proper element of
damages in traditional negligence actions and recently had become an interest
protected from intentional infliction.54 The court found no satisfactory dif-
ference between the possibilities for fraud in those cases and in bystander
situations. In reality, the disparate treatment of bystanders resulted from the
Amaya court's doubt that courts had the ability to limit liability. 
55
The Dillon court proposed limiting liability by examining "all the circum-
47. id.
48. If it is unjust to the defendant to make him bear the loss which he could not have foreseen, it
is no less unjust to the plaintiff to make him bear a loss which he could not have foreseen and which is
not even due to his own negligence, but to that of another.
Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 17 (1953).
49. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
50. Id. at 731, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
51. Id. at 732, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
52. Id. at 733, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
53. Id. at 735, 441 P.2d at 917, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
54. Id. at 736-38, 441 P.2d at 917-19, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77-79.
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stances" of the event 6 In essence, it proposed an emotional zone of danger,
the limits of which would be set by the reasonably foreseeable consequences
of the defendant's act? This elastic test would avoid the exclusion of meri-
torious claims, a result criticized by Amaya as a probable consequence of
utilizing Prosser's proposed guidelines 8 Because the all the circumstances
test would give little guidance to courts attempting to resolve the question of
liability, the court returned to Prosser's guidelines and set forth the following
three-prong test to assist other courts in determining the scope of bystander
liability:
(I) Whether the plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident, as contrasted
with one who was a distance away from it. (2) Whether the shock resulted from the
sensory and contemporaneous observation of the accident, as contrasted with
learning of the accident from others after its occurrence. (3) Whether the plaintiff
and the victim were closely related, as contrasted with the absence of any relation-
ship or the presence of only a distant relationship.
5 9
The majority held that the facts in Dillon, as judged by these guidelines,
constituted a prima facie case, but it declined to make any other con-
clusions.' The court gave no indication of the position it would take when the
facts did not satisfy each guideline so clearly. The court left the determination
of the lines of demarcation of the newly created zone of emotional danger to
courts confronted by cases resting "upon facts more subtle than the com-
pelling ones" in Dillon.6' The court professed its faith in the judiciary's ability
to reach just results through the application of the foreseeability test,62 free
from the artificiality of the zone of danger rule.
The dissent in Dillon correctly argued that fear of fraudulent claims did
not present the "prime hypothesis" for the denial of liability.63 Significant
issues, the socioeconomic circumstances in Amaya and the policy considera-
tions in Waube,64 were implicit in the court's motivation to reject the zone of
danger rule in favor of a rule of wider liability, but were poorly addressed by
the majority. In Dillon the court was concerned more with reaching a just
result for the Dillons than with constucting a legal mechanism courts could
employ later in different fact situations.65
55. See supra text accompanying notes 42-45.
56. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 741, 441 P.2d 912, 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 81 (1968).
57. Id.
58. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
59. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 740-41,441 P.2d 912,920, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80 (1968). Prosser apparently acknowledged
Amaya's criticisms of his proposed guidelines. The guideline concerning the plaintiff's presence was made
optional and was clarified by the addition of the phrase "rather than follow when the plaintiffis informed of the
whole matter at a later date." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 354 (3d ed. 1964). Dillon
reflected this change.
60. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 741, 441 P.2d 912, 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 81 (1968).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 747, 441 P.2d at 925, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
63. Id. at 751, 441 P.2d at 927, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 87 (Burke, J., dissenting).
64. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49 & 34.
65. The opinion of the Supreme Court of California in Dillon v. Legg, in which the traditional impact
and zone-of-danger rules were discarded in favor of determining the worthiness of plaintiff's claims on
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While the Dillon court acknowledged the need to limit liability,66 it also
envisioned liability in cases presenting facts different from those in Dillon.
The later cases demonstrate, however, a stagnation of the law and an unduly
narrow reading of Dillon. The California Supreme Court and appellate courts
have shown little creativity and a great deal of hesitancy in applying the Dillon
test.67
Dillon advocated the resolution of bystander claims by an examination of
"all the circumstances.' 8 This approach bore little resemblance to the tradi-
tional tort principles upon which it purportedly was based.69 The rejection of
the "hopeless artificiality" of Amaya left no substantive means of evaluating
the merit of emotional distress claims. Dillon removed the formal test present
in the Amaya zone of danger rule and replaced it with the nebulous test of
liability under all the circumstances. This loss of formality was not mourned,
because formality apparently was equated with artificiality."
The California judiciary recognized the absence of any formality and
acted quickly to supply it. In Archibald v. Braverman7' the court of appeal
relied exclusively upon the three guidelines in Dillon to resolve the plaintiff's
claim. Without expressly indicating that all three guidelines were required for
liability to ensue, the court nevertheless proceeded under that assumption.
No court after Dillon, including the supreme court, has applied the all the
circumstances test in a bystander context.73 No significant reliance on the
principle of foreseeability has developed either. Instead, courts have looked
only to the Dillon guidelines in weighing the foreseeability of the plaintiff's
emotional distress and thus have established an undeniably formal means to
adjudicate claims similar to that in Dillon.
Although the courts have failed to apply the all the circumstances test,
neither commentators nor the judiciary has criticized this divergence. 74 Both
a case by case ba;is, deserves to be enshrined as one of the great examples in our law of a court
abandoning decision-by-rule in the name of social justice.
Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467, 517 (1976).
66. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 739, 441 P.2d 912, 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 79 (1968).
67. See, e.g., Powers v. Sissoev, 39 Cal. App. 3d 865, 114 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1974).
68. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 741, 441 P.2d 912, 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 81 (1968).
69. Id. at 746, 441 P.2d at 924, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 84. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281
(1965).
70. See, e.g., Note, A Mother Witnessing the Negligent Injury of Her Child May Recover for Her Emo-
tional Distress Even Though She Was in No Personal Danger, 47 TEX. L. REV. 518, 521 (1968).
71. 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969).
72. Id. at 255, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
73. In Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980), the
California Supreme Court applied an all the circumstances test to a nonbystander situation. The court rejected
the defendant's contention that all three circumstances were required to establish a cause of action based on
Dillon. Although the court held that Dillon did not apply to the facts of the case, it deemed the Dillon foresee-
ability test as relevant. The court noted that "rote application" of the guidelines was contrary to the case by
case method advocated by Dillon. Despite this apparent condemnation of a strict construction of Dillon, the first
court of appeal bystander case after Molien, Hathaway v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. App. 3d 728, 169 Cal. Rptr.
435 (1980), used the three guidelines like an absolute test. The appellate court concluded that the three guideline
rule of Dillon remained intact for true bystander claims.
74. See Joseph, Dillon's Other Leg: The Extension of the Doctrine Which Permits Bystander Recovery for
Emotional Trauma and Physical Injury to Actions Based on Strict Liability in Tort, 18 DUIQ. L. REV. 1, 26
(1979).
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apparently have accepted the need to provide a formal framework for ad-
judication. As one commentator indicates:
The most basic limit of adjudication is that it requires substantive rules of suffi-
cient specificity to support orderly and rational argument on the question of li-
ability .... We are rapidly approaching the day when liability will be determined
routinely on a case by case, "under all the circumstances" basis, with decision
makers (often juries) guided only by the broadest of general principles. 75
The application of the Dillon rule illustrates certain hazards that accom-
pany an extensive abrogation of a prior rule of law. The rejection of unrea-
sonably artificial rules in the law should be encouraged; however, un-
doubtedly a need exists for formal rules of liability to provide a framework of
analysis and adjudication. Lawyers need the assistance of formal rules to
advise clients and plan trial strategy; judges must have a means to control the
trial process; most importantly, members of society should have some means
to predict the legal consequences of their actions. Without the presence of
formality in the process, none of these needs can be satisfied regularly. The
cases arising after Dillon are successful in this regard. These cases, however,
have not presented the ideal rules. The following sections will examine the
Dillon rule by focusing on the policy decisions underlying it.
IV. POST-DILLON ANALYSES
A. The Need for Physical Manifestation
Originally, Dillon required some physical manifestation of the plaintiff's
emotional distress,76 a requirement it retained from the Amaya zone of danger
rule.77 The courts interpreting Dillon have given little attention to this re-
quirement; most opinions concern the application of the three Dillon guide-
lines.7 Recently, this requirement was expressly eliminated by Molien v.
Kaiser Foundation Hospitals.79
The original purpose of the physical manifestations requirement was
identical to that of the impact requirement of the impact rule: validation of the
authenticity of plaintiffs claim.' Like the impact of the impact rule, however,
the physical manifestations that result are not exhaustive of all symptoms of
serious emotional distress. Because of recent advances in medical science,
the law should attempt to reformulate the definition of compensable emo-
tional distress!'
75. Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467, 468
(1976).
76. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 740, 441 P.2d 912, 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80 (1968).
77. 59 Cal. 2d 295, 299, 379 P.2d 513, 514, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 34 (1963).
78. Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 75-78, 562 P.2d 1022, 1030-31, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863, 871-72 (1977),
contains some discussion of this issue, but no attempt is made to define its meaning.
79. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
80. See supra text acompanying notes 23-24.
81. See Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L.
REV. 193, 305-06 (1944).
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Tragic events may elicit a two-stage response from a witness. An indi-
vidual's primary response is essentially an automatic reaction that acts as a
defense mechanism to shield him from the event. Reactions such as fear,
anger, grief, or shock exemplify primary responses. The response may be
trivial or substantial, depending on the psychological and physical makeup of
the individual and the nature of the traumatic event. 4 Because this reaction is
generally short-lived and because it cannot be substantiated with objective
criteria, it is seldom the basis for recovery.85 Not every individual who suffers
a primary response will encounter a secondary response. 6 The secondary
response results from the individual's inability to adjust to a traumatic eventY7
Unlike the primary response, the secondary response generally is longer in
duration and more amenable to objective verification. The three types of
secondary responses are (1) anxiety responses-reactions characterized by
anxiety and nervousness, gastrointestinal symptoms, cardiovascular symp-
toms, genito-urinary symptoms, fatigue, weakness, headaches, and back-
aches; (2) conversion responses-emotional reactions translated into physical
ailments such as paralysis and limited use of limbs of the body; and (3)
hypochondrial reactions-attitudinal changes unaccompanied by physical
symptoms and characterized by an obsessive concern for one's own health.8M
An element of objective criteria, although not necessarily a physical mani-
festation, is common in all three responses.
After Dillon courts gave little attention to the issue of permissible
physical manifestation. 89 The plaintiff merely had to allege some physical harm
to make a sufficient complaint. Molien expressly rejected this require-
ment, arguing that no valid line could be drawn between the physical and the
psychological; thus the plaintiff had to prove only the severity of his
distress."
When first announced the requirement of physical manifestation was a
proper limitation. It verified the severity of the emotional distress when
medical science had not yet achieved sufficient sophistication to accomplish
the task. With a better understanding of emotional responses, this need to
show physical manifestation should diminish.9' The secondary responses
82. Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an Independent Tort, 59 GEO. L.J. 1237,
1249 (1971).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1252.
85. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A comment c (1965).
86. See Smith & Soloman, Traumatic Neuroses in Court, 30 VA. L. REV. 87, 123 (1943).
87. See Comment, supra note 82, at 1249.
88. Laughlin, The Neuroses Following Trauma, in 6 TRAUMATIC MEDICINE AND SURGERY FOR THE
ATrORNEY 1301, at 104-08 (Cantor 1962).
89. See, e.g., Jansen v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 106 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1973). But
see Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59,562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977), in which the court examined the
causation of the physical injury.
90. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 929-30, 616 P.2d 813, 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 839 (1980).
91. See Comment, supra note 82, at 1260.
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basically are capable of objective verification. Thus, consistent with Molien,
the issue should be one of proof that utilizes objective criteria.
Once the court acknowledges that the issue is one of proof of emotional
distress, it then must determine the type or degree of emotional distress that
the law will recognize. Molien held that "some guarantee of genuineness" of
the evidence given should be required to sustain a claim.92 The court, how-
ever, was addressing only the issue of the evidence necessary to avoid a
demurrer. Courts must set a standard that allows the fact finder to distinguish
between compensable and noncompensable emotional distress.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts suggests a possible starting point to
begin this analysis. The following comment attempts to define actionable
emotional distress:
It is only when it is extreme that liability arises. Complete emotional tranquility is
seldom attainable in this world, and some degree of transient and trivial emotional
distress is part of the price of living among people. The law intervenes only when
the distress is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.
93
The comment clearly coincides with the distinction between primary and
secondary responses. Lasting emotional distress should be actionable. The
important distinction between Molien and the approach suggested by the
Restatement (Second) of Torts is the addition of the legal concept of the
reasonable person. Although not accordant with medical science, which does
not acknowledge a typical response to stressful events, courts must add a
reasonableness standard if bystander cases are to be adjudicated con-
sistently.94 The addition of a reasonable man standard provides a theoretical
underpinning to the test. Not all emotional distress is actionable; only
emotional distress which is so extreme that a reasonable individual would not
be expected to endure it will support a claim. Thus, severity is to be defined in
legal, not medical, terms. The fact finder will be responsible for determining
whether the particular emotional distress is beyond that which reasonable men
would be expected to endure.
B. The Relationship Guideline
The Dillon opinion begins with an illustration of the court's attitude
toward the issue of bystander recovery: "That the courts should allow re-
covery to a mother who suffers emotional distress and physical injury from
witnessing the infliction of death or injury to her child for which the tortfeasor
is liable in negligence would appear to be a compelling proposition."'95 The
motivation to extend liability stems not merely from a sense of legal obliga-
92. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 930, 616 P.2d 813, 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 839 (1980) (quoting Rodrigues v. State, 52
Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970)).
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment j (1965) (emphasis added). Accord D'Ambra v.
United States, 114 R.I. 643, 338 A.2d 524 (1975).
94. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 149-50 (4th ed. 1971).
95. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 730, 441 P.2d 912, 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 74 (1968).
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tion, but from a notion of natural justice.96 Although Dillon accords examina-
tion of the relationship between the plaintiff and the injured party as much
weight as other guidelines, 97 the degree of attachment is tied inexorably to any
resulting emotional distress.
98
In interpreting Dillon, courts and commentators have encountered little
difficulty in determining those relationships necessary to sustain recovery. 99
Compared with the other two guidelines, the issue of relationship presents the
least complicated determination. This relative simplicity may account for the
ease with which courts have defined the scope of this guideline.
Courts must be cognizant of the importance of the relationship issue
when determining the scope of this guideline. Every effort should be made to
prevent the inclusion of distant relationships and the exclusion of judicially
unrecognized but close relationships. For the most part, the California courts
have successfully struck a balance. The bulk of the cases confronted have
contained spousal, parental, or sibling relationships."° No challenge has been
made to the inclusion of these relationships; they are deemed sufficiently close
to merit a cause of action.
Only two cases dealt with the application of the relationship guideline to
nontraditional relationships.'0 ' In Mobaldi v. Board of Regents' 2 the plaintiff
was the foster mother of a three year old child killed by the defendant's
negligent injection of an improper intravenous solution.0 3 The court of appeal
rejected reliance on the presence or absence of a strictly legal relationship as
determinative of the limits of the guideline, holding that "[t]he emotional
attachments of the family relationship and not legal status are those which are
relevant."1 4
The Mobaldi court relied on a "logic of the close relationship" test and
found that the child had been with the foster family from the age of five
months and had treated the plaintiff as his true mother; thus the relationship
96. Id. at 731, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
97. See supra text accompanying note 59.
98. One court has stated that the emotional relationship is the most important of the Dillon guidelines:
Personal relationship may link people together more tightly, if less tangibly, than any mere physical or
chronological proximity .... Thus, where a mother witnesses the death of her child, it is only
reasonable that the parameters of liablity established by the zone of physical danger be bent to
accommodate the overwhelming impact of the mother's and child's mental and emotional relationship.
Anything less would be to deny psychological reality.
D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 656-57, 338 A.2d 524, 531 (1975).
99. Very little discussion has addressed this guideline. The only cases presenting it as a major issue are
Mobaldi and Drew. See infra text accompanying notes 101-07.
100. See, e.g., Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977) (plaintiff-husband;
victim-wife); Parsons v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 3d 506, 146 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1978) (plaintiffs-father, mother,
children; victims-other children); Powers v. Sissoev, 39 Cal. App. 3d 865, 114 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1974) (plaintiff-
mother; victim-daughter).
101. Arauz v. Gerhardt, 68 Cal. App. 3d 937, 137 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1977), concerned a guardian ad litem who
claimed emotional distress resulting from the injury to her ward. This issue was not discussed in the opinion
because the court denied a cause of action on other grounds. Id. at 949, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 627.
102. 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1976).
103. Id. at 578, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
104. Id. at 582, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
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possessed "all the incidents of parent and child except those flowing as a
matter of law." 5 Mobaldi demonstrates the proper approach to the relation-
ship guideline: courts should look to the substance of the relationship rather
than its form.
If Mobaldi represents a proper application of the relationship guideline,
then Drew v. Drake'06 stands as an improper approach. Criticism of the de-
cision does not stem from the Drew court's denial of recovery based on a
cohabitive relationship, but instead originates from the manner in which the
decision was reached. Although the plaintiff and the deceased lived together
for three years as "de facto spouses," the court denied a cause of action
because it found that the relationship was not sufficiently close.'07 The court
did not evaluate the intimacy of the relationship except by reference to the
absence of any legal relationship between the parties. The summary rejection
of the relationship as remote and unexpected, without further discussion, is
objectionable. The court ultimately may have been correct in finding the
relationship inappropriate to sustain a cause of action, but reliance on mere
legal status does not provide a rational basis to reach that conclusion.
Nonetheless, the legal status of the parties cannot be ignored. Society
assumes that a substantial degree of intimacy is present in legally recog-
nized relationships. Accordingly, a rebuttable presumption should operate in
the plaintiff's favor when such a relationship exists. The defendant could
overcome that presumption by presenting evidence of a lack of actual in-
timacy between the parties at the time of the accident. Conversely, in the
absence of a legally recognized relationship the plaintiff should be given the
opportunity to introduce evidence on the nature of the relationship.3 8 Above
all, courts should recognize that the form of the relationship should not over-
ride its substance.
C. The Observation and Location Guideline
The observation guideline (which interrelates with the location guideline)
consists of three distinct elements: (1) What was observed? (2) How was it
observed? (3) When was it observed? Courts have been fairly successful in
determining how the observation must take place, but they have not demon-
strated equal skill in defining the other two elements of the test. This
Comment will challenge the judicial definition of the proper subject of ob-
servation. Additionally, it will show that under the current application of the
Dillon rule no need exists to require a time element in the evaluation of the
plaintiff's observation.
105. Id. at 583, 127 Cal. Rotr. at 726.
106. 110 Cal. App. 3d 555, 168 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1980).
107. Id. at 557, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 66.
108. For example, if the defendant could demonstrate that the plaintiff and the victim, although married,
had been separated for four years, then that fact, not the legal status of the parties, should carry the greatest
significance in determining the sufficiency of the relationship for emotional distress purposes.
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1. The Manner of Observation: How was it observed?
If the relationship between the parties provides an emotional attachment,
then the observation of harm to one of the parties places strain on that at-
tachment.' 9 Observation is the conduit that brings the unpleasant event into
the plaintiff's consciousness. The more direct the impression, the more severe
the emotional injury." The Dillon court required sensory observation, a
direct means of perceiving the event, in contrast to a subsequent recital of the
facts by a third person."'
The courts have not required a visual observation in all cases, but have
provided an exception for constructive observation. Constructive observation
is the mental process by which the plaintiff realizes, without visual observa-
tion of the event, that harm has come to the third person. The California
Supreme Court adopted this position in Krouse v. Graham."2 The plaintiff
knew his wife's position at the rear door of his car and he also saw the
defendant's car approaching at a high rate of speed. Even though he did not
see his wife killed, the court concluded that he was a percipient witness to the
event." 3 The courts have successfully avoided an inflexible rule by focusing
on the direct nature of the cognition, rather than the mechanics of its percep-
tion. This development is the only positive result of the interpretation of this
guideline.
2. The Subject of Observation: What was observed?
An issue raised early in the post-Dillon cases concerned the subject of the
plaintiff's observation. The Dillon court failed to clarify whether observation
meant witnessing the tortious act, its results, or both. It spoke only of
"observation of the accident,""'4 an imprecise term that could mean either
event or both. The facts in Dillon presented simultaneous tortious conduct
and resulting harm, thus there was no need for the court to define the subject
of observation. When later cases arose, however, the courts were forced to
define the term.
In Jansen v. Children's Hospital Medical Center 15 the plaintiff raised the
issue of the proper subject of observation. She had witnessed the slow de-
terioration and death of her daughter, which she alleged was due to mal-
practice. The plaintiff contended that observation of the results was the
109. "No loss is greater than the loss of a loved one, and no tragedy is more wrenching than the helpless
apprehension of the death or serious injury of one whose very existence is a precious treasure." Portee v.
Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 97, 417 A.2d 521, 526 (1980).
110. See Laughlin, The Neuroses Following Trauma, in 6 TRAUMATIC MEDICINE AND SURGERY FOR
THE ATTORNEY 1 1301, at 104-08 (Cantor 1962).
111. See supra text accompanying note 59.
112. 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977).
113. Id. at 76, 562 P.2d at 1031, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
114. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 741, 441 P.2d 912, 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80 (1968) (emphasis added).
115. 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 106 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1973).
(Vol. 43:931
DILLON REVISITED
essence of the second Dillon guideline." 6 The court of appeal rejected this
formulation of Dillon, ruling that the injury-producing event itself must be
observed and the event must be of a sudden and brief nature capable of
sensory perception." '7
The Jansen position required some means of distinguishing Archibald v.
Braverman,"8 which permitted recovery when the plaintiff arrived on the
scene after the event." 9 The court solved this dilemma by inferring that the
plaintiff heard the explosion that caused the injury, thus meeting the require-
ment of observing the injury-producing event. 120 The court's position, how-
ever, is erroneous. The event that affects the plaintiffs emotional distress is
not the act, but the results of that act. This position was accepted implicitly in
Archibald and was adopted expressly in Mobaldi: "It is the observation of the
consequences of the negligent act and not observation of the act itself that is
likely to cause [severe] emotional trauma."' 2' The only justification for re-
quiring that the plaintiff observe the tortious act is to limit the number of
potential plaintiffs, because the number of people who could witness injuries
is significantly greater than those fortuitous enough to see the tortious act. 122
This rule excludes a wide spectrum of claims in which the act is not observed
in any manner, or worse, is nonobservable.' 2 A limitation on the number of
cases can be achieved by erecting distinctions that have more merit than the
act-result dichotomy. For example, an alternative limitation can be imposed
through more stringent requirements of what constitutes actionable emotional
distress. This change would limit the number of claims without the artificiality
produced by requiring observation of the tortious act.
If the Dillon rule is altered so that observation of the results of the
tortious activity would permit recovery, the type of harm that must be ob-
served to meet the Dillon requirement necessarily will have to be defined.
This definition will have two components. The first concerns the manner in
which the harm appears. In Jansen the harm to the child was gradual. While
the impact upon the mother may have been substantial, from a practical
viewpoint no liability should ensue. As the Restatement (Second) of Torts
notes, there are certain incidental costs to living in society. 24 The pain en-
116. Id. at 24, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 885. That contention was unavoidable because she could not point to any
"act" of negligence capable of observation.
117. Id.
118. 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969).
119. Id. at 254-55, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
120. 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 24-25, 106 Cal. Rptr. 883, 885 (1973).
121. 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 583, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720, 727 (1976).
122. Referring to the nearly identical legal situation in Great Britain, one commentator made the following
conclusion: "The actual decisions in the cases suggest that the [guidelines] are simply designed to provide
criteria for selecting a small number of cases for compensation out of the large potential number." P. ATIYAH,
ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 81 (3d ed. 1980). Of the cases cited supra in note 4, only Mobaldi,
Austin, and Krouse presented facts that indicated the plaintiff observed the act as it occurred.
123. For example, the act may be nonobservable in cases concerning medical malpractice in which the
tortious conduct is an error of omission rather than a discrete act.
124. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment j (1965).
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dured when family members are ill or injured is one of those emotional costs.
The law intervenes only when the plaintiff bears an unusual or aggravated
burden.'25 Jansen held that the observed event had to be sudden and brief.'26
This requirement, for two reasons, is applicable also to the type of harm
witnessed. First, a slow deterioration in health is characteristic of the type of
harm with which individuals are expected to cope. And second, an element of
emotional preparation exists when the injury develops slowly. 27 Thus, com-
pensable shock to the plaintiff will come from the sharp contrast between the
healthy victim and the injured victim. A Dillon cause of action should not
arise when a long period of time transpires between the cognizance of the two
extremes.
The second component of the type of harm definition considers the se-
verity of the third party's injury. Consistent with the requirement of a sharp
contrast between the healthy victim and the harmed victim, an attempt also
should be made to define the nature of the harm sufficient to maintain a cause of
action. A requirement of "serious bodily harm or death" is appropriate for
the task.22 The Restatement (Second) of Torts uses this term to define the
limits of the privilege of self-defense. It can be applied also to characterize the
severity of bodily harm needed to meet the requirements of Dillon:
The phrase "serious bodily harm" is used to describe a bodily harm the conse-
quence of which is so grave or serious that it is regarded as differing in kind, and
not merely in degree, from other bodily harm. A harm which creates a substantial
risk of fatal consequences is a "serious bodily harm," as is a harm the infliction of
which constitutes the crime of mayhem.
29
The definition limits the number of potential plaintiffs in. bystander claims and
excludes claims based on insubstantial harm caused by the defendant. The
harm actually must be serious, not merely perceived by the plaintiff as
serious. The defendant's liability comes into issue only when he actually has
inflicted serious bodily harm.
The Dillon rule has avoided confronting these issues by requiring that the
plaintiff observe the tortious act. This fallacious approach cannot be tolerated
when other possible means of weighing liability without the infirmities of the
current rule exist.
125. Cf. Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977) (recovery denied for
death of unborn child).
126. 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 24, 106 Cal. Rptr. 883, 884 (1973).
127. See Laughlin, The Neuroses Following Trauma, in 6 TRAUMATIC MEDICINE AND SURGERY FOR
THE ATTORNEY 1301, at 104-08 (Cantor 1962).
128. See, e.g., Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980):
The harm we have determined to be worthy of judicial redress is the trauma accompanying the
observation of the death or serious physical injury of a loved one. While any harm to a spouse or a
family member causes sorrow, we are here concerned with a more narrowly confined interest in mental
and emotional stability .... We hold that the observation of either death or this type of serious injury
is necessary to permit recovery.
Id. at 100, 417 A.2d at 527-28.
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 63 comment b (1965).
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3. The Timeliness of Observation: When was it observed?
Dillon requires an observation to be contemporaneous with the tortious
event.30 Thus, when the plaintiff in Deboe v. Horn'31 arrived at the hospital
several hours after the injury had been caused, the court denied recovery
because the observation did not occur within time limits closely connected to
the accident. 32 This result is reasonable. Presumably, the plaintiff was aware
before she saw her husband that he had been hurt; thus the impact of his
injury was not as direct as in true bystander cases. She may have had time to
prepare herself emotionally for the sight of her injured husband; therefore the
shock may not have been wholly unanticipated. A requirement of contem-
poraneity is useful to some extent, but only because it coincides with other
indicia that simultaneously demonstrate the inappropriateness of permitting
recovery.
Any utility of a requirement of contemporaneity, however, diminished
when courts began to define the subject of observation as the injury-produc-
ing event. 133 Contemporaneity has no meaning in this context. Acts are either
observed or not. The requirement became one of instantaneous observation.
Thus, in Parsons v. Superior Court'34 two members of the plaintiffs' family
were passengers in the defendant's auto; the plaintiffs were following closely
behind. The defendant demolished the car by driving it into a pole. The
plaintiffs arrived on the scene immediately thereafter, but did not actually see
or hear the accident. Accordingly, the court held that no cause of action could
be claimed under Dillon. This result illustrates the superfluous nature of the
requirement of contemporaneity. It is not truly a part of the Dillon test. By
requiring the plaintiff to observe the act rather than its results, the court did
not need to examine the timeliness of the observation. Any observation after
the act necessarily would prevent recovery.
If, however, the subject of observation includes the results of the de-
fendant's act, the time element becomes relevant. If the plaintiff can recover
for shock caused by witnessing the resultant injuries, some limits on the time
of observation are desirable. Mobaldi recognized the need to require a close
connection of "perception, time and geography in order to avoid an overly
broad scope of liability." 136 Without these limitations, all tortious acts pos-
sibly could engender bystander claims if a relative happens to see the injured
party at any time after the accident when the injuries are still evident. This
result would be contrary to the presumption that bystander claims are justi-
fied by their extreme or aggravated nature. The issue of contemporaneity is
130. See supra text accompanying note 59.
131. 16 Cal. App. 3d 221, 94 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1971).
132. Id. at 224, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 114-29.
134. 81 Cal. App. 3d 506, 146 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1978).
135. Id. at 512, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
136. 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 585, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720, 728 (1976).
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useful in this situation. The plaintiffs observation of the injuries should be
contemporaneous with their inception. This approach is more accordant with
the requirements of a direct emotional impact and a contrast in the victim's
condition. But without a change in the "what" of observation, contem-
poraneity has no significant function.
V. CONCLUSION
The Dillon rule, like most tenets of law, is neither completely perfect nor
totally unjust. However, the negative aspects of the Dillon rule, particularly
the error in the definition of the subject of observation' 37-the "what"-have
overshadowed its positive aspects. The positive aspects of the rule-its ad-
mirable formality, 38 its liberal interpretation of the manner of observation,39
its rejection of the physical manifestations test, 140 and its flexible resolution of
the relationship issue M---have been impaired by the trend to utilize the act
observation rather than the result observation. By rejecting the act and adopt-
ing the result approach, the Dillon rule would be consistent with the actual
manner in which emotional distress is suffered.
With this change judicial or legislative efforts should be made to supply
clear definitions of what harm is appropriate to sustain a cause of action and
which level of emotional distress is compensable. Reliance on objective cri-
teria would serve better than the current absence of any criteria. Additionally,
it will be necessary to limit potential claims to those situations that present a
close connection in time, perception, and geography, while recognizing that
extreme or aggravated situations also may be worthy of recovery. What
follows is an attempt to bring together all the positive aspects and proposed
changes discussed above into a workable rule.
(I) Question of law: Does the relationship between the plaintiff and the
victim contain the essence of familial or spousal ties?
(2) Question of fact:
(a) Did the defendant act negligently to cause severe bodily harm or
death to the victim?
(b) Did the plaintiff observe any of the following:
(i) The development or infliction of serious bodily harm or
death;
(ii) serious bodily harm or death after its occurrence but without
material change in condition and location of the victim?
(c) Did the plaintiff appreciate the severity of the victim's condition
at the time of the observance?
137. See supra text accompanying notes 114-29.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 66-75.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 109-13.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 76-91.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 95-108.
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(d) Did the plaintiff suffer severe emotional distress?
(e) Was the observance of the victim's condition a substantial factor
in causing the plaintiff's emotional distress?
This Comment does not contend that this model will resolve all the diffi-
culties encountered in the adjudication of bystander claims. The essential
purpose of this Comment has been to demonstrate the inadequacies of the
Dillon rule and to encourage innovation (by the judiciary or the legislatures
considering the implementation of wider bystander liability) to avoid these
inadequacies.
John David Burley

